Abstract We examine a variety of preference-based de…nitions of ambiguous events in the context of the smooth ambiguity model. We …rst consider the de…nition proposed in Klibano¤ et al (2005) based on the classic Ellsberg two-urn paradox (Ellsberg (1961) ), and show that it satis…es several desirable properties. We then compare this de…nition with those of Nehring (1999), Epstein and Zhang (2001) , Zhang (2002) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) . Within the smooth ambiguity model, we show that Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) would identify the same set of ambiguous and unambiguous events as our de…nition while Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Zhang (2002) would yield a di¤erent classi…cation. Moreover, we discuss and formally identify two key sources of the di¤erences compared to Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Zhang (2002) . The more interesting source is that these two de…nitions can confound non-constant ambiguity attitude and the ambiguity of an event.
has many attractive properties in the context of the smooth ambiguity model. We show that the set of unambiguous events must be a -system -a collection of sets satisfying closure under complements and …nite disjoint unions. The literature has argued that it is reasonable to expect the set of unambiguous events to be a -system. Furthermore, we show that an event being unambiguous is connected to the existence of a qualitative probability relation on a -system including that event. Second, we use the smooth ambiguity model to compare this de…nition with others in the literature, including those of Nehring (1999) , Epstein and Zhang (2001) , Zhang (2002) , Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2011) . We show that Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Zhang (2002) do not generally identify the same set of ambiguous and unambiguous events as we do. Moreover, we discuss and formally identify two key sources of the di¤erences compared to Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Zhang (2002) . One source is that these two de…nitions can confound non-constant ambiguity attitude and the ambiguity of an event. The other source is that our de…nition takes advantage of the additional structure we place on the environment to determine that some events are ambiguous when these two de…nitions would not. In contrast, we show that Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) identify the same set of ambiguous and unambiguous events as we do (as does the de…nition in Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2011) , as that paper shows). A further result relevant to this discussion is that the only departures from expected utility that may arise in the smooth ambiguity model are also departures from probabilistic sophistication. Thus, di¤erences in implicit assumptions about the ambiguity neutral benchmark cannot be a source of the di¤erent performance of the de…nitions in the smooth ambiguity model. Finally, as regards Nehring (1999) , we show that all events we identify as unambiguous are so identi…ed by his de…nition, however the converse remains an open question.
Other authors have previously critiqued aspects of some of these de…nitions. For example, Amarante and Filiz (2007) examine all of these de…nitions in the context of the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and explore their properties in that setting. This leads them to some critiques of Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Zhang (2002) related to an incompatibility between a continuity requirement and these two de…nitions of unambiguous events. This point, along with other critiques, also appears in Nehring (2006) . Parts of Kopylov (2007) might also be viewed as a critique and improvement upon aspects of Epstein and Zhang (2001) . One result proved by Kopylov is that the collection of unambiguous events identi…ed by Epstein and Zhang (2001) need not form a -system, but rather a weaker structure called a mosaic. None of these papers, nor, to our knowledge, any others, point out the challenge that non-constant ambiguity attitudes pose for attempts to identify ambiguous/unambiguous events. Working with the smooth ambiguity model both leads us to and allows us to examine this issue, since one of the main di¤erences between the smooth ambiguity model and many of the other models in the literature is its use of ambiguity attitude non-constant in either an absolute or relative sense (or both), similar to non-constancy of risk attitudes in an absolute or relative sense that appears in expected utility theory. We show that certain of the de…nitions have trouble handling this nonconstancy while others do not. In our …nal section, we discuss an example showing that other types of non-constant ambiguity attitude than those that can appear in the smooth ambiguity model may give our de…nition di¢ culty.
Ambiguity: ambiguous events and ambiguous acts
We begin by recalling the following setting, de…nitions and results from Klibano¤ et al (2005) :
Let A be the Borel -algebra of a separable metric space , and B 1 the Borel -algebra of (0; 1]. Consider the state space S = (0; 1], endowed with the product -algebra A B 1 .
The space (0; 1] is introduced simply to model a rich set of lotteries as a set of Savage acts. For the remainder of this paper, all events will be assumed to belong to unless stated otherwise. We denote by f : S ! C a Savage act, where C is the set of consequences. We assume C to be an interval in R containing the interval [ 1; 1]. Given a preference on the set of Savage acts, F denotes the set of all bounded -measurable Savage acts; i.e., f 2 F if fs 2 S : f (s) xg 2 for each x 2 C, and if there exist x 0 ; x 00 2 C such that x 0 f x 00 . Given the Lebesgue measure : B 1 ! [0; 1], let : ! [0; 1] be a countably additive product probability such that (A B) = (A (0; 1]) (B) for A 2 A and B 2 B 1 . The set of all such probabilities is denoted by .
We call % a smooth ambiguity preference if it has a representation of the following form:
where u : C! R is a continuous, strictly increasing utility function, : fu (x) : x 2 Cg ! R is continuous and strictly increasing, and is a countably additive probability measure over . What makes an event ambiguous or unambiguous by our de…nition rests on a test of behavior, with respect to bets on the event, inspired by the Ellsberg two-urn experiment (Ellsberg (1961) ). The role corresponding to bets on the draw from the urn with the known mixture of balls is played here by bets on events in f g B 1 . We say an event E 2 is ambiguous if, analogous to the modal behavior observed in the Ellsberg experiment, betting on E is less desirable than betting on some event B in f g B 1 , and betting on E c is also less desirable than betting on B c : Similarly, we would also say E is ambiguous if both comparisons were reversed, or if one were indi¤erence and the other were not.
Notation 2.1 If x; y 2 C and A 2 , xAy denotes the binary act which pays x if s 2 A and y otherwise.
De…nition 2.1 (KMM (2005)) An event E 2 is unambiguous if, for each event B 2 f g B 1 , and for each x; y 2 C such that x y ; either, [xEy xBy and yEx yBx] or, [xEy xBy and yEx yBx] or [xEy xBy and yEx yBx] : An event is ambiguous if it is not unambiguous.
The next proposition shows a shorter form of the de…nition that is equivalent to the original in the context of the smooth ambiguity model. Though this form lacks as immediate an identi…cation with the Ellsberg experiment, it helps in understanding what makes an event unambiguous: an event is unambiguous if it is possible to calibrate the likelihood of the event with respect to events in f g B 1 .
Proposition 2.1 (KMM (2005)) Assume is a smooth ambiguity preference. An event E 2 is unambiguous if and only if for each x and y with x y , xEy xBy () yEx yBx:
whenever B 2 f g B 1 .
The next theorem relates ambiguity of an event to event probabilities in the smooth ambiguity representation. Thus, in our model, if there is agreement about an event's probability then that event is unambiguous. Furthermore, if has some range over which it re ‡ects either strict smooth ambiguity aversion or strict smooth ambiguity seeking then disagreement about an event's probability implies that the event is ambiguous. When the support of is …nite, the meaning of disagreement about an event's probability in the theorem above simpli…es to: there exist ; 0 2 such that (E) 6 = 0 (E). We now turn to the substance of the current paper, which we begin by examining other properties of unambiguous events in the context of the smooth ambiguity model.
It has been widely argued in the literature that closure under …nite intersection should not generally be expected from unambiguous events (e.g., Epstein and Zhang (2001) , Marinacci (2002), Zhang (2002) ) and that, therefore, one should not generally expect the set of unambiguous events to form an algebra. A -system is a weaker mathematical structure dropping this intersection requirement of an algebra, and the cited papers argued that expecting the set of unambiguous events to be a -system is reasonable. Formally, say that a collection of events A is a -system if (i) S 2 A; (ii) A 2 A ) A c 2 A; and (iii) A 1 ; A 2 2 A and
This could be called a …nite -system since (iii) requires only closure under …nite disjoint unions rather than the closure under countable disjoint unions required in e.g., Billingsley (1986) , p. 36. The following corollary to Theorem 2.1 observes that in the smooth ambiguity model, given our de…nition of unambiguous events, the collection of all unambiguous events always forms a -system. Examples such as in Zhang (2002) could be used to show it does not always form an algebra.
Corollary 2.1 Suppose is a smooth ambiguity preference and either is linear or there is some nonempty open interval of utility values over which is strictly concave or strictly convex. Let be the collection of all unambiguous events in . Then is a (…nite) -system.
Next, we identify an unambiguous act as an act which is measurable with respect to , the collection of all unambiguous events in .
De…nition 2.2 An act f 2 F is an unambiguous act if it is measurable with respect to : Let H be the set of all unambiguous acts.
To gain further insight into our de…nition of an unambiguous event and its appropriateness in the context of our model, we introduce the following concept combining the standard notion of a qualitative probability with an additional necessary condition for the existence of a probability and likelihood revealed through bets on events. (Conditions (i ) through (iv ) in the de…nition de…ne a qualitative probability, condition (v ) is also necessary for the existence of a representing probability and condition (vi ) connects this qualitative probability with over bets.) De…nition 2.3 We call a binary relation q on a -system A a qualitative probability relation for if it is (i) complete and transitive, (ii)
In the original, the condition on was replaced by equivalent assumptions on preferences. To make the current paper self-contained, in this and subsequent results, we state conditions directly on with the understanding that the interested reader can refer to Klibano¤ et al (2005) for the equivalent assumptions on preferences. There it is shown that concavity (convexity) of corresponds to a behavioral notion of ambiguity aversion (seeking). is said to have probabilistic beliefs if there exists a qualitative probability relation for on all of .
If A is an algebra, conditions (i )-(iv ) imply (v ) (see e.g., Kreps (1988) , p. 118). However, as observed by Zhang (1999) , this is not true if A is merely a -system. Since (v ) is a necessary condition for the existence of a probability representing q on A, it makes sense to include it here. In any case, the result below on the existence of a qualitative probability relation for is false without condition (v ).
The next result uses this preference based notion of qualitative probability relation to give an alternative characterization of ambiguous events in our setting.
Corollary 2.2
Assume is a smooth ambiguity preference and either is linear or there is some nonempty open interval of utility values over which is strictly concave or strictly convex. Fix an event E 2 . Then E is unambiguous if and only if there exists a qualitative probability relation for on some -system that is a superset of fE; E c ; Bg.
Remark 2.1 The "if" part of the claim in Corollary 2.2 does not depend on being a smooth ambiguity preference or the conditions on .
The existence of a qualitative probability relation for on a -system containing fE; E c ; Bg intuitively means that the event E can be compared in a consistent way with the rich set of events in the Borel -algebra B.
The most important class of preferences exhibiting probabilistic beliefs are the probabilistically sophisticated preferences of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) . Besides probabilistic beliefs, they also require some additional conditions which are super ‡uous for our purposes. Given the smooth ambiguity model, the only departure from expected utility that may arise is one due to ambiguity sensitive behavior, behavior that is not probabilistically sophisticated, as formally detailed in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3
Assume is a smooth ambiguity preference. Consider the following four properties:
is probabilistically sophisticated (iii) has a subjective expected utility representation (iv) For each event E, there exists a 2 [0; 1] such that (E) = , -a.e.
Then,
Moreover, all four properties are equivalent whenever there is some nonempty open interval of utility values over which is strictly concave or strictly convex, while the …rst three are equivalent (and true) whenever is linear.
Relating to other notions of ambiguity
In this section, we compare, in the context of the smooth ambiguity model, our behavioral de…nition of ambiguity with the behavioral de…nitions proposed in Epstein and Zhang (2001) , Zhang (2002) , Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Nehring (1999) . Throughout this section we assume that is …nite and that = 2 B. We …rst relate our de…nition to the notion of ambiguity developed in Epstein and Zhang (2001) . Their notion of ambiguity was designed to apply to a wide variety of models of preferences.
De…nition 3.1 (Epstein-Zhang (2001) ) An event T is unambiguous if: (a) for all disjoint subevents A, B of T c , acts h, and outcomes x ; x; z; z 0 ; 0
and (b) the condition obtained if T is everywhere replaced by T c in (a) is also satis…ed. Otherwise, T is ambiguous . This de…nition works by looking for conditional likelihood reversals over events in the complement of the event being tested for ambiguity. Our de…nition instead looks for likelihood reversals involving the event being tested for ambiguity and events in B. Note that such a strategy was not available to Epstein and Zhang since they wished their de…nition to have power in environments that might lack an appropriately rich set of unambiguous events.
Is our de…nition of ambiguity identical to that of Epstein and Zhang (2001) when applied to the smooth ambiguity model? The answer is no. How do they di¤er? It is of interest to note at the outset, given the many discussions comparing notions of ambiguity due to Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , the reason for the di¤erence cannot be that our de…nition confounds ambiguity with probabilistically sophisticated departures from expected utility. As we have shown in the previous subsection (Corollaries 2.2 and 2.3), whenever our de…nition identi…es an event as ambiguous, behavior is not probabilistically sophisticated. Nevertheless, one might still expect, since we can take advantage of the rich structure of our model, that any di¤erence would lie in the direction of our de…nition classifying more events as ambiguous than Epstein and Zhang. This is part of the story: in Example 3.1 we show that there may be some events that are ambiguous according to our de…nition that are not according to Epstein and Zhang. Example 3.1 Let = f! 1 ; : : : ; ! n g. The measure assigns probability 1=2 to both 0 and 1 , where 0 and 1 yield marginals on of
respectively, with 1 < 2 . The utility function is u(x) = x (risk neutrality). The function is (x) = e x with > 0. Since 0 (! 1 ) = 1 < 2 = 1 (! 1 ) and is strictly concave, Theorem 2.1 implies that the event ! 1 [0; 1) is ambiguous according to the de…nition in this paper. We now demonstrate that it is unambiguous according to the de…nition of Epstein and Zhang (2001) 1 (E): Under the speci…ed preferences, the top pair of acts in De…nition 3.1 is evaluated according to
h(s) 1(s)) ;
(2) and
1 (E) and simplifying yields (2) (3) if and only if
The evaluation of the lower pair of acts in De…nition 3.1 di¤ ers only by substituting z 0 for z. It is not hard to show that preference in the lower pair is also determined by (4). Therefore condition (a) of the de…nition is satis…ed. Setting T = (! 1 [0; 1)) c and noting that, again, all events in T c will be assigned the same relative weights under any leads to the conclusion that condition (b) of the de…nition holds as well. Therefore, ! 1 [0; 1) is unambiguous according to De…nition 3.1.
The intuition behind this example is that Epstein and Zhang (2001) ambiguity requires a reversal in the relative likelihoods of two events lying in the complement of the candidate ambiguous event. The preferences in the example have the property that the ambiguity on the candidate event a¤ects the likelihoods of all events in its complement in the same way -thus relative likelihoods in the complement are unchanged. In the formal result below, we show that such situations are in some sense rare in that by perturbing the beliefs of the decision maker even slightly one may have the ambiguity generate the di¤erences in relative likelihoods needed for De…nition 3.1. This is not the whole story however. We show in Example 3.2 that the Epstein and Zhang de…nition may, more surprisingly, classify as ambiguous some events that are unambiguous according to our de…nition. This may appear somewhat strange, given that if E is unambiguous in our framework (under regularity conditions on ) then preferences restricted to acts measurable with respect to the -system generated by f;; E; E c ; B; Sg are probabilistically sophisticated (and, in fact, are expected utility). respectively. The utility function is u(x) = x (risk neutrality). The function is (x) = ln(x).
Since 0 (! 1 ) = 1 (! 1 ) = 0:5, the event ! 1 [0; 1) is unambiguous according to the de…nition in this paper. We now demonstrate that it is ambiguous according to the de…nition of Epstein and Zhang (2001) What is going on in this example? The function (x) = ln(x) does not re ‡ect a constant ambiguity attitude (for a formal de…nition see De…nition 6 in Klibano¤ et al (2005) ). In particular, as the acts under consideration get better and better in terms of expected utilities, the ambiguity aversion of such a decision maker diminishes. This is in close analogy to risk theory, since ln(x) displays constant relative risk aversion but diminishing absolute risk aversion when used as a utility function. In our example, A is unambiguous, while B is ambiguous but has a higher average probability than A. When z = 0 the expected utilities of the acts are relatively low under all the measures and the portion of the ln(x) function that is quite ambiguity averse is the relevant one. Here A gets favored over B. When considering z 0 = 100 however, the acts get considerably higher expected utilities and a portion of the ln(x) function that is much less concave (ambiguity averse) is relevant. In the second case, ambiguity aversion has diminished enough that the decision maker is now willing to favor the ambiguous-but-higher-average-probability event, B over the unambiguous one, A. Examples of this kind may be constructed quite generally when ambiguity aversion is not constant. In such a case, changing payo¤s on any event E, no matter what its ambiguity status, may lead to a conditional likelihood reversal between two events in E c if at least one of the two events in E c is ambiguous. This occurs because changing payo¤s may change ambiguity attitude thus possibly a¤ecting the decision maker's ranking of events. If all events in E c are unambiguous, changing ambiguity attitude cannot a¤ect the ranking of these events and thus a conditional likelihood reversal would not occur in this case.
This example suggests that when a rich set of events like B over which the decision maker has a probability is available, our approach allows one to distinguish between reversals due to the ambiguity of the event being tested and those due to changing ambiguity attitude.
As the next theorem shows, the di¤erences identi…ed in the above two examples are in some sense the only ones separating the two de…nitions of ambiguity in our setting. The second example is dealt with by the assumption of constant ambiguity aversion. The …rst example is dealt with by showing that perturbing the beliefs of the decision maker by as small amount as one wishes can eliminate this type of disagreement. We should note that the statement in part (b) of the theorem below (concerning di¤erences in the direction of the …rst example) does not go as far as one might hope. In particular, the perturbation argument we develop works for events in 2 [0; 1) rather than general events in , assumes that has a …nite support and, even though the perturbations required are arbitrarily small, we have not been able to rule out that they might change the ambiguity classi…cation of some compound events (i.e., events not of the form ! [0; 1)). This contrasts with part (a) of the theorem (concerning di¤erences in the direction of the second example), which applies to all events and whose proof does not make use of the …nite support assumption. Part (a) shows quite strongly that di¤erences in the direction of the second example indeed stem from non-constant ambiguity attitude.
De…nition 3.2 An event E
is null if, for all x; y; z 2 C;
Proposition 3.1 An event E is null if and only if (E [0; 1)) = 0, -a.e.
Theorem 3.1 Assume that contains at least three non-null states and that (x) = e x ; > 0 (i.e., preferences display constant ambiguity aversion (see Proposition 2 of Klibano¤ et al (2005) )).
(a) If an event E 2 is unambiguous according to De…nition 2.1, then it is unambiguous according to the de…nition in Epstein-Zhang (2001) . (b) If an event E [0; 1) is ambiguous according to De…nition 2.1, then there exists a sequence of perturbations of ( support of ), denoted ( n ), with lim n!1 ( n ) = and lim n!1 n = 0, such that for all n, given ( n ):
(i) The event E [0; 1) is ambiguous according to the de…nition in Epstein-Zhang (2001) , and, (ii) for each ! 2 ; ! [0; 1) is ambiguous according to De…nition 2.1 if and only if ! [0; 1) was ambiguous according to De…nition 2.1 given :
An analogous result is true with < 0 and (x) = e x (constant ambiguity seeking). We next turn to the de…nition of unambiguous event proposed by Zhang (2002) . This is a strengthening of Epstein and Zhang (2001) 's de…nition. Instead of requiring the acts on T c to have a speci…c structure, Zhang (2002) allows them to be arbitrary. Thus, an event is unambiguous according to Zhang (2002) if changing the outcome on the event never leads to reversals in preference on the complementary event. Formally: Zhang (2002) ) An event T is unambiguous if: (a) for all acts f; g, and outcomes z; z 0 ;
and (b) the condition obtained if T is everywhere replaced by T c in (a) is also satis…ed. Otherwise, T is ambiguous .
Since this de…nition classi…es fewer events as unambiguous than Epstein and Zhang (2001) , it is immediate that Example 3.2 applies equally to Zhang's de…nition, and thus it also shares with that de…nition the feature of allowing non-constant ambiguity aversion to interfere with its ability to identify which events are ambiguous. Although not as immediate, it is also true that Example 3.1 generates the same phenomenon under the Zhang (2002) de…nition as it did for Epstein and Zhang (2001) . The uniformity of the probabilities on T c in that example serves equally well to eliminate the reversals checked for in the Zhang (2002) de…nition as it did to eliminate the subset of those reversals checked for in Epstein and Zhang (2001) . Therefore, in the context of the smooth ambiguity model, both of the key sources of di¤erence we identi…ed when discussing Epstein and Zhang (2001) also apply to Zhang's (2002) de…nition.
Next we relate our de…nition of ambiguity to the de…nition proposed by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) . The de…nition they propose applies to a very general class of preferences which includes smooth ambiguity preferences. In their de…nition, they invoke a notion of a benchmark preference for which is any subjective expected utility preference that is less ambiguity averse than (in the sense that whenever an act f is ranked weakly above a lottery l by then this is also true for the benchmark preference). Given any smooth ambiguity preference, there would seem to be a natural subjective expected utility benchmark: the preference generated by replacing with the identity (or any other strictly increasing linear function). Note, however, that this "benchmark"will not necessarily satisfy the requirement from Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) for a benchmark, as it need not be less ambiguity averse than . Their de…nition could, nevertheless, in principle, be applied with any subjective expected utility preference sharing the same risk preferences as as the benchmark, even if it were not less ambiguity averse than . It is in this expanded sense that we use their de…nition here.
In the following theorem, we show that for smooth ambiguity preferences (with a regularity condition on ), the collection of unambiguous events ( ) and the collection of unambiguous acts (H) identi…ed by the de…nitions based on Klibano¤ et al (2005) (De…nitions 2.1 and 2.2 in this paper, respectively) are identical to the collections identi…ed by the corresponding de…nitions in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) with the "benchmark" > taken to be the expected utility preference generated from the smooth ambiguity preference by taking linear. If the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 were strengthened to require that were globally either linear, strictly concave or strictly convex, then the "benchmark"used in the theorem would indeed be a benchmark according to Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) as well. In this case, Theorem 4 of the working paper version of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , 2 may be used to show that H gm > is actually independent of the particular benchmark > and hence we may drop the subscript and, letting H gm denote the set of acts identi…ed as unambiguous in the Ghirardato-Marinacci de…nition and gm denote the unambiguous events, strengthen the conclusion of Theorem 3.2 to H = H gm and = gm . While Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) provide a simple characterization of ambiguous acts and events for biseparable preferences they do not have a corresponding result for general preferences. In particular, smooth ambiguity preferences (except for expected utility) are not contained in the biseparable class. Hence, the formal relationship described above between our de…nitions and the Ghirardato-Marinacci de…nitions of ambiguous acts and events in the context of , does not follow from the characterization obtained in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) . What explains the above result that the two de…nitions of ambiguous acts, ours and Ghirardato-Marinacci's, coincide in the smooth ambiguity model? The explanation lies in two key properties shared by the de…nitions. One is that according to both de…nitions, if two acts are measurable with respect to the same collection of events, then if one of the acts is unambiguous so is the other; the actual payo¤s do not matter, only the partition generated by the acts. The other key property is that the set of unambiguous events, according to Ghirardato-Marinacci, is a partition such that the ranking between acts measurable with respect to that partition is the same, whether given by the benchmark preference relation or whether given by the ambiguity sensitive preference relation: behavior with respect to these events is una¤ected by ambiguity attitude. In our model there is a natural benchmark corresponding to any given preference, namely the subjective expected utility relation obtained by making linear without changing any other aspect of the given preference. Our de…nition of ambiguity identi…es those events as unambiguous for which there is no disagreement about probabilities. In our model, ranking between acts measurable with respect to such events according to the given preference must coincide with that corresponding to the benchmark expected utility preference.
In the context of the smooth ambiguity model, under the same regularity assumptions on as in Theorem 3.2, it is also true that our de…nition identi…es the same sets of unambiguous acts and events as the de…nition recently proposed in Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2011) (see their paper for a proof).
Finally, we turn to the de…nition proposed in (Nehring 1999, De…nition 4) . He formally states the de…nition only in the context of real-valued acts and risk neutrality. So as to make the comparison clearest, let us temporarily adopt these restrictions as well. Under these restrictions, we show that any event identi…ed as by our De…nition 2.1 as unambiguous is also unambiguous according to (Nehring 1999, De…nition 4) . It is an open question whether the converse implication always holds. We next state his de…nition. To do so, note that adding a real number to an act should be interpreted as generating another act by, state-by-state, adding the real number to the outcome of the original act. 
If is linear, then De…nitions 2.1 and 3.5 both classify all events as unambiguous. When is nonlinear, the next result shows that any event unambiguous according to De…nition 2.1 is also unambiguous according to De…nition 3.5.
Theorem 3.3
Suppose is a smooth ambiguity preference, with u(x) = x for x 2 R and such that there is a nonempty open interval over which is strictly concave or strictly convex. An event E 2 is unambiguous according to De…nition 3.5 if it is unambiguous according to De…nition 2.1.
Beyond the smooth ambiguity model
We have argued that the de…nition of ambiguous events we used in Klibano¤ et al (2005) performs well and has desirable properties in the context of the smooth ambiguity model. Is it true more generally, beyond the smooth ambiguity model, that this de…nition captures all that one might mean by ambiguous event? The following example, adapted from Nehring (1999) , suggests this may not be the case.
Example 4.1 Let = f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g and let u be the utility function. Suppose that % over acts f are represented by u (f (! m )) where ! m is a state such that f yields a middle-ranked outcome (e.g.
Under our de…nition, all events are unambiguous according to this preference. To see this, observe that any bet on an event containing one or fewer states is treated as a bet on an event given zero probability and any bet on an event containing at least two states is treated as a bet on an event given probability one. Thus bets on an event and on its complement may be calibrated to bets on (and against) an unambiguous zero probability event, and no reversals as in the two-color Ellsberg paradox (or the three color Ellsberg paradox) can occur.
Nonetheless, preferences fail to be probabilistically sophisticated and might be motivated in terms of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude in the following way: suppose the individual considers all probability distributions over possible, is in…nitely ambiguity averse when evaluating "small" events (those with one or fewer states), and is in…nitely ambiguity loving when evaluating "large" events (those with two or more states). Since the event of being equal to or above a middle-ranked outcome is always a "large event"while the events of being strictly below or of being strictly above a middle-ranked outcome are always "small" events, the preferences would be as in the example. Such an individual might be said to consider all non-trivial events ambiguous, but because their ambiguity attitude varies dramatically with the size of the events, something not permitted in the smooth ambiguity model, our de…nition fails to pick this up.
Conclusion
We have shown that a de…nition of unambiguous event motivated by Ellsberg's two-urn paradox and stated in Klibano¤ et al (2005) works well in the context of the smooth ambiguity model. In that context, we also showed that the alternative de…nition proposed by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) reduces to our de…nition. In contrast, we show that the de…nitions proposed by Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Zhang (2002) , when applied to the smooth ambiguity model, do not always agree with our de…nition. Moreover, we identify the sources of this di¤erence, the most interesting of which is the fact that the Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Zhang (2002) de…nitions may classify an event as ambiguous when the preference reversal they use to do so is generated by ambiguity attitude changing with payo¤s rather than ambiguity of the event. The fact that the literature prior to the smooth ambiguity model focused on models displaying constant ambiguity attitude as payo¤s change (in particular any preference satisfying the C-Independence axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or its weakening in Maccheroni et al (2006) will display such constancy) perhaps explains why this aspect of these de…nitions remained unnoticed previously. Seeing how di¤erent de…nitions perform in the context of the smooth ambiguity model has, in this sense, proved quite valuable.
A Appendix: Proofs and Related Material
A.1 Corollary 2.1 Let be a smooth ambiguity preference and either is linear or there is some nonempty open interval of utility values over which is strictly concave or strictly convex. First consider the case where is linear. In this case, preferences are expected utility and hence coincides with , a -algebra and therefore, a -system. Next consider the case where there is some nonempty open interval of utility values over which is strictly concave or strictly convex and let E; F 2 s:t: E \ F = ?: By Theorem 2.1, E unambiguous implies there exists a 2 [0; 1] such that (E) = for almost all . Also, (E c ) = 1 for almost all . Similarly, there exists a 0 2 [0; 1] such that (F ) = 0 and (F c ) = 1 0 and for almost all . Since is a probability measure and E \ F = ?, it follows that (E [ F ) = + 0 for almost all . Hence, by Theorem 2.1, E [ F is unambiguous. Finally, note that it follows directly from De…nition 2.1 that S is unambiguous and that if E is unambiguous then so is E c .
A.2 Corollary 2.2 "If ": Fix an event E. Suppose that q is a qualitative probability relation for on a -system A E = fE; E c ; Bg : By properties (i), (v), and (vi) in the de…nition of a qualitative probability relation, E is unambiguous.
"Only if": Let denote the set of all unambiguous events in : Suppose that E, and therefore all elements of E, is unambiguous. By Corollary 2.1, is a -system. By our hypothesis, E : First, suppose there is some nonempty open interval of utility values over which is strictly concave or strictly convex. By Theorem 2.1, for every A 2 there exists a (A) 2 [0; 1] such that (A) = (A) for almost all . So, a probability representing the likelihood relation on -system E exists and therefore a qualitative probability relation for exists on the same -system. Alternatively, suppose is linear. In this case, preferences are expected utility and hence a probability representing the likelihood relation on -system E exists and therefore a qualitative probability relation for exists on the same -system. Therefore E unambiguous implies the existence of a qualitative probability relation for on a -system containing E.
A.3 Corollary 2.3
By the representation (iv) =) (iii). The implications (iii) =) (ii) =) (i) are obvious. By Theorem 2.1, (i) =) (iv) when there is some nonempty open interval of utility values over which is strictly concave or strictly convex. To see this, observe that if q is a qualitative probability relation for on , then by Corollary 2.2 all events E 2 are unambiguous. By Theorem 2.1, provided there is some nonempty open interval of utility values over which is strictly concave or strictly convex, this implies agreement about each event's probability. As to the case where is linear, recall that has an expected utility representation.
A.4 Results of Section 3
For the following proofs we need a piece of notation. As we assumed to be …nite in this section, we can use 
A.4.1 Proposition 3.1
Suppose i (E [0; 1)) = 0, for almost all i: By the smooth ambiguity representation,
Therefore E is null. To prove the other direction, suppose E is null. To generate a contradiction assume i (E [0; 1)) > 0 for i 2 H where (H) = c > 0: Fix x and z such that x z . Set y = 0. By the smooth ambiguity representation,
A.4.2 Theorem 3.1 (a) Fix any event E that is unambiguous according to De…nition 2.1. Suppose, 0
Then according to our representation,
Since E is unambiguous according to De…nition 2.1 and is strictly concave, Theorem 2.1 implies i (E) is almost everywhere constant in i and hence the u (z) term can be taken outside the integral on both sides and canceled. This can clearly be done, in exactly the same way, if z is replaced by some z 0 in the acts above. Therefore for any z 0 2 C, 0
Since, under De…nition 2.1, E unambiguous implies that E c is unambiguous, a similar preference implication can be derived replacing E by E c . Thus E is unambiguous according to the de…nition in Epstein and Zhang (2001) .
(b) 3 Fix any E such that E [0; 1) is ambiguous according to de…nition 2.1. The strategy for showing that this event is ambiguous according to Epstein and Zhang (2001) after a suitable perturbation of the measures in is as follows: We eventually select a particular pair of acts for which we will show that there is the type of conditional likelihood reversal required by Epstein and Zhang (2001) . Using our representation, we are able to …nd equations (6, 7) that are necessary for no reversal to occur. It turns out that there are essentially only two ways these two equations can hold simultaneously given that i (E [0; 1)) is not constant. One way is for the relative probabilities of the events in the complement of E [0; 1) to remain unchanged, as happened in Example 3.1. A second, related way is that although the relative probabilities of the events in the complement do change, they do so in a way which happens to exactly "cancel out" on level sets of i (E [0; 1)). We construct the perturbation of precisely to prevent these two circumstances from happening (and also to maintain the ambiguity/unambiguity of all events of the form ! [0; 1) as required by part b(ii) of the theorem). We then are able to conclude that the needed reversal in preference does occur and E [0; 1) is indeed ambiguous according to Epstein and Zhang (2001) .
We begin by constructing the needed perturbation to prevent both the "cancelling out" on level sets problem (by making sure all such sets are singletons) and the constancy of relative probabilities problem (by direct perturbation). Since E [0; 1) is ambiguous and unambiguous events are closed under disjoint unions, there must exist an ! 1 2 E such that ! 1 [0; 1) is ambiguous. Fix such an ! 1 . Choose ! 2 , ! 3 2 as follows. By Theorem 2.1, there exist i; j 2 I such that i (E [0; 1)) 6 = j (E [0; 1)). Given such i and j, since probabilities sum to 1, there must be an ! 0 2 nE such that ! 0 [0; 1) is ambiguous. Set ! 2 equal to some such ! 0 . Choose ! 3 to be any element of n (E [ f! 2 g) such that ! 3 [0; 1) is non-null. Without loss of generality we may assume that such a ! 3 exists. 4 Given , construct ( n) as follows:
Step 1 : Recall that I [0; 1]. Divide I into sets of the form
Let J 0 denote the collection of sets I including exactly each such set that is not a singleton, has 6 = 0 and 6 = 1, and has i (! 2 [0; 1)) > 0 for all i 2 I . Let J = fi j i 2 I for some I 2 J 0 g. Let H 0 denote the collection of sets I including exactly those that are not in J 0 , and have 6 = 0. Let H = fi j i 2 I for some I 2 H 0 g. Choose n > 0 no larger than the minimum of {half the minimum distance between the values associated with the I sets, half of min i2J (1
and half of min
If there are ! 2 E such that ! [0; 1) is unambiguous, then transfer a total mass of n to ! 1 taken evenly from these unambiguous states for each i.
Note that the way we have chosen n and the fact that I [0; 1] ensures that E [0; 1), ! 1 [0; 1) and ! 2 [0; 1) remain ambiguous according to de…nition 2.1 and that no new "bunchings" of i (E [0; 1)) have been created.
Step 2 : For each i 2 H, let (if there was mass transferred to ! 1 from the unambiguous states in E in the previous step) 1 i ( n) (! 1 [0; 1)) = i (! 1 [0; 1)) i n; otherwise subtract the i n from the ambiguous states in E in any way that doesn't push any below 0
Note that the way we have chosen n and the fact that I [0; 1] ensures that E [0; 1), ! 1 [0; 1) and ! 2 [0; 1) and any other ambiguous ! 2 E remain ambiguous according to De…nition 2.1 and that no new "bunchings" of i (E [0; 1)) have been created.
Step 3: For all points and for all i 2 I at which 1 i ( n) has yet to be de…ned, let
The end result of Steps 1 through 3 is a set of probabilities 1 ( n) 1 i ( n) i2I that has the same set of ambiguous events of the form ! [0; 1) as but, except (possibly) where
Step 4 : This step should only be undertaken if the ratio
is constant across all i 2 I such that 
Step 5 : For all points and for all i 2 I at which 2 i ( n) has yet to be de…ned, let
Then de…ne ( n) = 2 ( n). Notice, because of Step 4, that the ratio
cannot be constant across all i 2 I such that i ( n) (E [0; 1)) > 0: This fact will be used in the proof below.
Above, n was allowed to be real number strictly between zero and an upper bound that was the minimum of several terms. To form a sequence, select any sequence of numbers f ng 1 n=1 in this range such that the limn!1 n = 0: Observe, that given our construction, limn!1 ( n) = (speci…cally, limn!1 i ( n) (E) = i (E) for all i 2 I and all E 2 ): Now we proceed to show that, given any such ( n) ;the event E [0; 1) is ambiguous according to the de…nition in Epstein and Zhang (2001) . Consider the pair of acts depicted below (where E; ! 2 and ! 3 are as in the construction of
Given our representation of preferences, the decision maker is indi¤erent between these two acts i¤
Let t be the unique t that solves equation (6). Such a t exists since the left-hand side is continuously increasing in t and is equal to 1 at t = 0 while the right-hand side is continuously decreasing in t and is equal to 1 at t = 1. If E [0; 1) were unambiguous according to Epstein and Zhang (2001) , it would be the case that
for all c 2 U : In terms of our representation, this means
Taking the derivative of both sides of equation (7) with respect to c and evaluating at c = 0,
In fact, since equation (7) is an identity in c, we can di¤erentiate both sides as many times as we wish while maintaining equality. Calculating this out, we see
for all m = 0; 1; 2; ::: . Since by construction of
, either i ( n) (E [0; 1)) = 0; in which case those terms in the system of equations (9) get no weight, or, for the remaining i's we can strictly order the i ( n)' s by the weight they give to E [0; 1) : Let i be the index of the i ( n) that gives the largest such weight. Divide both sides of the each equation in the system of equations above by
m . We can then rewrite the system as, for all m = 0; 1; 2; : : : ;
A necessary condition for the above system of equations to hold is that
To see this, observe that for any > 0 there exists an M such that for all m > M ,
This is true because 0 i ( n) (E [0; 1)) < i ( n) (! 1 [0; 1)) 1 and all the other terms are bounded. Given equation (11), we can cancel the i terms from both sides of the equations in the system (9). This gives a new system of equations. For this new system …nd the i such that i ( n) (E [0; 1)) gives the largest weight and repeat the above steps to show that e t i ( n )(! 3 [0;1)) (i) = e (1 t ) i ( n)(!2 [0;1)) (i) ;
for that i: Canceling and repeating k 2 more times (or until the largest remaining i ( n) (E [0; 1)) = 0), we …nd e t i ( n )(! 3 [0;1)) = e (1 t ) i ( n )(! 2 [0;1)) ;
for all i 2 I such that i ( n) (! 1 [0; 1)) > 0: This is only possible if i (! 3 [0; 1)) i (! 2 [0; 1)) = 1 t t for all i 2 I such that i ( n) (! 1 [0; 1)) > 0: As noticed above in the construction of ( n), this cannot be true. Therefore we have a contradiction and it cannot be that E [0; 1) unambiguous according to the de…nition in Epstein and Zhang (2001) .
A.4.3 Theorem 3.2
We …rst report a result from the working paper version of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , where it is stated as Theorem 4. We now prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let >, the "benchmark", be the special case of where is linear. That is, > is represented by V > (f ) = P 
Since is strictly increasing, the way ranks acts belonging to H is equivalently given by the functional,
u (f (!; r)) dr
Notice, V > (f ) also reduces to the functional (12). Hence, and > agree on H. Since H contains all the constant acts this proves that part (A) of De…nition 3.4 holds for H. On the other hand, it is immediate to see that part (B) holds as well. Thus, since H gm > is the largest subset satisfying (A) and (B), it follows that H H gm > . As to the converse inclusion, we consider the case of strictly concave on J (the strictly convex on J case being similar). We take an act f = 2 H and go on to show that f = 2 H gm > either. It is enough to consider acts f such that the expected utility of f according to each in the support of lies in J. To see why this is the case, assume f is such that some of these expected utilities do not lie in J. Let fx 1 ; :::; xng be the range of the …nite-valued act f . Since u is strictly increasing on the interval C, it is di¤erentiable on C except on at most a countable subset M of C. The function u is therefore locally Lipschitz on C M . Since J is an open interval and u is strictly increasing and continuous, u 1 (J) is an open interval. Hence, u 1 (J) \ (C M ) 6 = ;, and so there exists c 2 u 1 (J) at which u is locally Lipschitz. Let (c "; c + ") be a neighborhood of c over which u is locally Lipschitz. Since J is an open interval, by taking " small enough, we can assume that [u (c) "; u (c) + "] u 1 (J). It is easy to check that there exist 6 = 0 and 2 R such that j x i + cj " for each i = 1; :::n. Hence, by the local Lipschitz property, ju ( x i + ) u (c)j ", and so
for all probabilities 2 . Hence, We denote the constant act valued at the -average expected utility of f by u 1 (e( f )) . As f = 2 H, either u 1 (e( f )) f or u 1 (e( f )) f . Suppose, …rst, the preference is strict. Since for the benchmark preference >, u 1 (e( f )) and f are indi¤erent, part (A) of De…nition 3.4 is violated for f .
Next, suppose u 1 (e( f )) f . By the strict concavity of (on J) this implies that the expected utility of f under each in the support of is the same. For, if not, then by strict concavity of ,
